It is axiomatic that nation-states in an anarchic system are required to provide for their own security, and analyzing exactly how countries make these difficult choices constitutes the field of security studies. Within this literature there is a sub-set dedicated to qualitative competition among actors; concerning itself with how levels of technology are created and then diffused among actors (Evangelista 1988; Goldman and Eliason 2003; Paarlberg 2004; Rosen 1984) . This literature on military technology commonly assumes, explicitly or implicitly, that each actor strives to stretch the boundaries of technology and to field the most technologically advanced forces possible --constrained only by budget (Schilling et al. 1962) or arms-control agreement (Goldman 1994; Schelling and Halperin 1985) . 1 We problematize that assumption by assessing whether actors may be able to strategically withhold new technological developments to their advantage.
The case of pre-First World War British naval supremacy provides a compelling case to consider. In the second half of the 'long' nineteenth century, naval technology was changing at a rapid pace. Britain, the greatest naval power of the era, was fretting over maintaining its lead over rising challengers, namely France, Russia, and Germany.
This period provides a classic example of a qualitative, as well as quantitative, arms race among rival powers and allows us to discern how a technological lead can be managed.
A key participant in this competition, the colorful British Admiral Sir Jackie
Fisher, suggested the kernel of a prescriptive theory he referred to as 'plunging'. This is the parceling out of technological innovations to preempt rivals and, thereby, maximize the leverage a technological lead may provide. We expand upon and formalize Fisher's rough writings to flesh out a more complete theory of plunging. We then use the model to shed light upon debates over Britain's naval policy vis-à-vis its rivals in the decades before the First World War.
To do so we develop a model of military technology competition among nationstates. These actors can choose to introduce new military technology, mimic its rival's level of technology, or withdraw from the contest. Actors can choose to implement any level of technology within their current feasible technologies. We find that actors with significant technological leads should, under specified conditions, withhold technologies and only strategically release them to trump rival's efforts. For a leading actor, increasing its technological implementation level has two countervailing effects: (i) it increases its short-run payoff by way of increasing bargaining power in a time of peace and military power in a time of war, and (ii) it decreases the actor's future payoff by narrowing its future advantage in technology. Thus, the choice to plunge is optimal when the second, indirect, effect is strong enough relative to overpower the first effect. At the extreme, if an actor has a sufficient lead and is sufficiently patient, it will want to make the minimal progress to keep its rival mimicking.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we explore the writings of Sir Jackie
Fisher on weapons technology and develop the intuition behind our argument. In section 3 we propose a formal model of the strategic management of technology -refining
Fisher's concept into two component parts: 'positive plunging' (implementing better technology than a rival) and 'negative plunging' (the withholding of technology). In section 4 we return to the British case and show how the refined model of plunging helps to re-interpret naval policy choices. In section 5 we offer some general conclusions, relate our model to a recent policy debate, and propose directions for future research.
BRITISH NAVAL POLICY, JACKIE FISHER, AND THE CONCEPT OF PLUNGING
Naval technology changed more in the second half of the nineteenth century than it had in the previous ten centuries (Marder 1976: 4) . Ships changed from wooden-hulled, sail-powered platforms carrying smooth-bored, muzzle-loading cannon that fired solid shot to compartmentalized steel-hulled, turbine driven platforms carrying rifle-bored, breech-loading guns that fired high-explosive munitions (Brodie 1943; presented new threats and challenges to naval strategy and shipbuilding policy.
The British Position
Britain ruled the waves during the period between the Crimean War and the First World War, but its maritime preeminence was the result of massive investment and carefully crafted policy. Naval supremacy was regarded as of paramount concern to the island nation as it relied on imported commodities and was responsible for a global empire. Britain needed to manage its maritime lead along two dimensions: quantitative and qualitative. In terms of quantity, Britain's pace of capital ship building was encoded in the 'two power standard' (roughly laying two keels to one against the second and third naval powers combined), but the management of the qualitative lead was more difficult and policy was less clear. To explicate the British management of its technological lead we discuss it in two parts: Britain's concern with 'leveling the playing field' with competitors and Admiral Fisher's loose conception of plunging as a prescription for British policy. In doing these tasks we distill an argument for a formal theory of plunging that will be developed in the following sections of the paper.
One chief concern for British policymakers during this period of rapid technological change was the leveling of the playing field vis-à-vis its rivals. (Marder 1956: 25) .
Fisher, then, was aware of these risks, but felt that innovation was inevitable, writing to Winston Churchill in 1912 that " [t] he luxuries of the present are the necessities of the future" (Marder 1956: 426) . The key for Fisher was to utilize technological change as a leveraging tool in Britain's naval supremacy, not as a specter to be feared. It is his ruminations on leveraging technological leads through plunging which provides the basis for our argument.
Fisher's vision of plunging
Fisher's career in the Admiralty was characterized by his focus on emerging technology and its impact on Britain's naval strategy and, hence, overall national security.
Aware of the dangers of new technology to Britain's preeminent status, but also aware of the inevitability of technological progress, Fisher developed the concept of plunging as a strategy to leverage Britain's lead over emerging rivals (Lambert 2004: 279-281 
The expected payoff of each actor depends on an uncertain state of the world, which we will refer to as "possibilities". For simplicity, we assume two possibilities: war and peace. Denote by € µ, the probability of war and € (1− µ) the probability of peace such that € µ ∈ (0,1). The distribution is assumed to be independent and identical each period.
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In peacetime, the implemented technology level affects the bargaining power of the two actors. Thus, we define the expected payoff in peacetime, for actor i by,
where
. In wartime the visible technology is important, but so is the hidden technological capacity; production of that technology could ensue and at least some of the hidden technology could be utilized. Thus, we define the expected payoff in wartime,
.
The following assumptions specify the basic properties of each actor's possible single period payoff. 
This assumption encompasses the fact that the expected payoff from peace to actor i is increasing in its own technological level, while decreasing in its rival's. This reflects the additional bargaining power in peacetime negotiations leveraged from an increased technological level. In addition, the assumption reflects diminishing marginal returns to an actor's technological level. 
Assumption 2 The wartime payoff has the following attributes: The function
This assumption captures the feature that the expected payoff from war to actor i is increasing in its own technological level and capacity, while decreasing in its rival's. This reflects the increased probability of war success that accompanies increased technology.
Assumption 3 For all
This final assumption is that a rival's technological capacity does not impact the marginal impact of an agent's technological level on their war-time payoff.
The expected payoff of actor i of period t is denoted by
In the interest of parsimony, we assume that each actor has a common discount factor € δ ∈ (0,1). We now move to analysis of the equilibrium behavior in our model.
Equilibrium
We focus on Markov perfect equilibrium of our game. That is, equilibrium strategies that only depend on the most recent choices. In accord with our equilibrium concept, we focus on Markov strategies in levels based only on the current capacity choices and Markov strategies in capacities based on the previous period capacities and levels. Next we define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 1 A Sequential Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE) is the possibility based
for all s and x such that,
The key to our ensuing analysis of technological levels is a reduction in the dimensionality of the strategies we must analyze. In particular, we are interested in SMPE where both actors always maximize technological capacity. These are equilibria such that each actor chooses technological capacity according to the following rule ( †).
For all
Let us, for now, impose capacity choices following ( †) into our model and analyze the equilibrium strategies in levels. In the formal analysis we show capacity play according to ( †) is part of our unique equilibrium.
Since, we focus on maximum capacity strategies we can write the expected payoff of actor i as a function of the current capacity € x t and the current choice € s t and, under the supposition that an a SMPE exists, strategies for time
Hence, we can express the equilibrium expected payoff of actor i purely as a function of € x t and € s t . Define recursively the equilibrium expected payoff in
It is useful to first study optimal Markov strategies of an actor informally; this is best done broken into two cases. Case 1 is when both actors are similar enough in technology such that they both choose to innovate in period t.
Case 1:
Let us suppose that
. Rule ( †) implies that for both actors, . Therefore, if a equilibrium exists, it must be such that
Consider a second case where one actor has a sufficient lead to induce the other actor to imitate.
Case 2:
Consider the case that
, where without loss of generality we focus on the case that actor 1 is in the technological lead.
Following the same lines as Case 1, we know that it is optimal for actor 2 to choose 2 2 t t x s = . That is, actor 2 will gain on the margin by increasing their technological level for all levels up to their capacity (since actor 1 will never imitate). Now, let us consider the choice of actor 1. In contrast to Case 1, the future payoff of actor 1 is impacted by their choice of implementation level in two ways. The first is directly through their period t expected payoff (the same as in case 1) . This is what we label the direct effect on their current expected payoff. The second is indirect through the influence on actor 2's future technological capacity. We call this the indirect imitation effect on their future expected payoff. The two effects impact the payoff of actor 1 in opposing ways. An increase in The following theorem provides a characterization of the SMPE that we have described informally. In the characterization we drop the time subscripts as they are unnecessary since strategies are only state dependent. Denote by ) ( x s i the optimal action of actor i given the state x. 1-3 10 , there exists a unique SMPE characterized as follows:
Theorem 1 Under assumptions
• For all possibilities x such that
• Equilibrium capacity choices follow ( †).
The formal proof of this result is relegated to the appendix. The key factor that induces negative plunging (withholding technological capacity) is that the indirect effect weighs strong enough to make the marginal effect of an increase in level negative at full capacity implementation. Since the expected payoff of actor i is strictly concave in its current technological level, a decrease in level away from capacity will increase actor i's payoff.
Outside the scope of the formal theorem we can address some underlying comparative statics of potential interest. It should be quite obvious that the parameters of the model dictate the choice to plunge or not. A primary implication of Theorem 1 is that the greater the patience of actor i, ceteris paribus, the more actor i is willing to engage in negative plunging. This is because increased patience puts more weight on the actor's future payoff, which is decreasing in their current technological level. This is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For all x such that
An alternative interpretation of an increase in δ is that the time period for technological progress is shortened. That is technology is able to change more rapidly and technological decision happen more frequently. This relates to our next result.
The parameter α represents the exogenous maximal rate of technological innovation. The greater the maximal rate of technological progress, ceteris paribus, the more severe negative plunging will become. This is because negative plunging can create a larger gap in the future technologies. Thus, the future benefit of withholding technology becomes greater.
Theorem 3 For all x such that
, and
Another important factor is the marginal sensitivity of the war payoff to changes in technological capacity; the more sensitive the war payoff is to changes in capacity, the lower the critical discount factor for negative plunging ( ) ( ) It is worth noting that it is not entirely clear that a greater lead in technological capacity is more likely to lead to negative plunging. This is because, while the greater disparity in technology can decrease the marginal impact of current levels on country 1's future payoff, it also increases the marginal impact of current levels on 1's current payoff.
This highlights the impact of the threat environment on strategic choice over technological levels in and of themselves.
The impact of these factors is an important aspect of the model. It not only shows the sensitivity of force structure planning to the international context, it specifies how changes in military technology, current force structure, and threat perception should impact the strategic choice of actors. Returning to the British case, we can re-evaluate some of the strategic choices of the Admiralty in a new light.
WAS 'PLUNGING' EMPLOYED BY BRITAIN?
To what degree was a plunging strategy actually employed by the British navy?
There is little evidence that this was a coherent or consistent policy, but there is some evidence to suggest that the notion of strategically managing its technological lead was, to some degree, employed as our model predicts. Further, our refinement of Fisher's rough ideas into distinct 'positive plunging' and 'negative plunging' components provides new insights into the trajectory of British naval policy from the Crimean War to the First World War. We argue that from 1856-1898, the British were patient and felt that the war payoff was relatively more sensitive to unimplemented technological capacity.
These parameter values increase the value of negative plunging (withholding technological leads) as well as positive plunging; we observe this in British naval policy. The first period we consider spans 1856-1898. This is characterized by the British for a relatively low threat environment, as Britain was not challenged by a peer competitor in its naval supremacy. This not only resulted in Britain being patient, but also confident in its ability to utilize its technological lead with celerity should war occur. We find that, as predicted by the model, Britain engaged in both the positive and negative aspects of plunging in this period: strategically trumping rivals' technological advances, but also refraining from superfluous technology diffusion by implementing below their full capacity.
Consider the following summary of the period: "The British Navy was...conservative in its designs, preferring to let other navies innovate, and then to use its greatly superior resources (including the ability to build ships more quickly than other navies) when other experiments were shown to be successful" (Stoll 1992: 268) . Morris adds that these British warships that were "built in response to foreign initiatives" were also "themselves full of new ideas. They were seldom built as classes, but were generally only in ones and twos...they were sample ships" (1995: 90). Admiral Fisher's writings support this attitude: "whatever type the French have, we must go one better, and that is a principle which will always keep us safe, and, if we built as quickly as we ought to build, we ought always to commence after they are well advanced and have the more powerful vessel afloat beforehand" (Marder 1952: 174) . This shows the model's predictions being born out in Britain's surface fleet: confidence in shipbuilding speed and general patience allowed Britain to strategically parse out its technological capacity. It was implementing ahead of its rivals, but only when forced to do so.
Besides surface ships, the late nineteenth century also saw the development of Britain's policy towards submarines in this period was quite clearly, then, to withhold technological capacity to prevent its diffusion.
There are several important points embedded in the evidence from this period.
The first is the fact that, due to a lack of peer competitor pressure, Britain could refrain from innovation and merely respond to foreign challenges by trumping rivals efforts through rapid counter-developments (encompassing both the positive and negative aspects of plunging). The second is the fact that Britain could rely on its industrial base to rapidly implement new ship technology; this is an example of marginal sensitivity of excess capacity on wartime payoffs, as Britain could rapidly implement hidden technology if war were to occur. These parameter values predict both positive plunging, which we observe clearly in Britain's surface ships, and negative plunging, which we observe both in Britain's surface ships and submarine warfare policy.
Britain's growing rivalry with Germany, [1898] [1899] [1900] [1901] [1902] [1903] [1904] [1905] [1906] [1907] [1908] [1909] [1910] [1911] [1912] [1913] [1914] By the turn of the century Britain's security in its naval supremacy was beginning to diminish as Germany began a bid for significantly increased influence, if not hegemony, in Europe. This can be traced back to Germany's Navy Laws of 1898 and 1900 which signaled an aggressive expansion in naval capabilities (Steinberg 1971 , Marder 1956 : 22, Sumida 1990 . Admiral Fisher himself was so fixated on the rising menace that in a letter to Whitehall in April 1905, he implored the foreign ministry to engineer a war with Germany: "this seems a golden opportunity for fighting the Germans in alliance with the French, so I earnestly hope you may be able to bring this about" (Marder 1956: 55) .
Not only did the rise of Germany, along with the solidification of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente, increase threat environment for Britain in the first decade of the twentieth century, but increasing competition by late-industrializers made Britain less secure in the future commercial and imperial payoffs accruing due to her naval lead (a decrease in δ) (Smith 1981) .
Further, the nature of Germany's technical capacity made Britain rethink the marginal sensitivity of excess capacity on wartime payoffs. Underinvestment in Britain's industrial base was leading to its being surpassed in shipbuilding capacity by Germany (Robertson 1974 ). Stoll argues that this changing parameter value was prominent in the minds of British policymakers: "consider the British situation when the focus of British naval concern shifted from France and Russia to Germany...one additional factor enters into British calculations; the speed of German naval construction approached that of the British, so part of the cushion of British safety disappeared" (1992: 271-272).
Given these changing parameter values, then, the model predicts a continued policy of positive plunging (staying ahead of rivals), but no longer one of negative plunging (withholding capacity). This turns out to be the case in both surface ships and submarine vessels. Both would be implemented at levels higher to maximum technological capacity.
The move away from negative plunging in terms of surface ships helps explain the decision to build the HMS Dreadnought. Fisher, for example, claims great success for this positive plunge in a letter to King Edward in 1907:
[I]t is an absolute fact that Germany had not...commenced building a single big ship for 18 months (Germany has been paralysed by the Dreadnought!). The more the German Admiralty looked into her qualities, the more convinced they became that they must follow suit, and the more convinced they were that the whole of their existing Battle Fleet was utterly useless… (Marder 1956: 139-140) . abandon our policy of discouragement and to adopt one of unostentatious progress..." (Lambert 2001: 25) . In fact, Britain's policy changed to such a degree that they began to build a submarine fleet at least five years before the Germans, and had a considerably larger fleet of these vessels at the outbreak of the First World War (Brodie 1943: 291-292) . Our refined plunging model, then, sheds some additional light on Britain's naval policies of the pre-World War I era. As Britain's position in the international system began to change, and her capacity to field new ship designs more quickly than its rivals began to diminish, then the policy of withholding technology to prevent diffusion became less tenable. After the rise of the German threat, the direct effects of implemented technology (positive plunging) outweighed the indirect effect of withheld technological capacity (negative plunging) because of an increased threat environment and increasing capacity in German shipbuilding. These results help explain Britain's notorious decision to build the HMS Dreadnought and to change its long-standing submarine policy.
CONCLUSIONS
We have refined the rough concept of plunging which had been loosely articulated by the Admiral Jackie Fisher. By doing so, we have been able to logically account for controversial British naval planning decisions that have been hotly debated for over a century by historians. Here we summarize the technical results of the model, discuss its applicability to current policy, and discuss avenues of future research.
Our model formalized the idea that an actor with a military technology advantage must consider two countervailing effects when determining implementation levels. First, there is a direct effect that increases the short-run payoff through peaceful bargaining power and increased chances of winning a war. In contrast, there is an indirect imitation effect, which decreases an actor's future expected payoff through increasing the future technological capacity and level of its rival. An actor will find it optimal to withhold technology and employ a strategy of negative plunging if the indirect imitation effect dominates the direct effect. In terms of the underlying parameters, both increased patience and increased marginal sensitivity of wartime payoffs to unimplemented technological capacity increase the benefit of negative plunging.
The refined plunging model we develop is particularly pertinent for current US defense policy. In many ways modern tactical aircraft mirror late nineteenth century capital ships. They are both very expensive weapons systems that are extremely sensitive to technological advances and both constitute very iconic symbols of a country's prestige and influence on the international stage. The United States military is currently in transition in its air superiority and ground attack aircraft. Existing systems, such as the A-10 ground attack aircraft, F-15 air superiority aircraft, and F-16 multi-purpose models have been in service for decades and are currently being replaced by the F-22 air superiority aircraft, and the family of F-35 (JSF) multi-purpose models. Fierce debate continues, however, as to how many, if any, of these newer models should have been fielded (Bennett 2008 , Kosiak and Watts 2007 , Murch and Bolkcom 2007 . Our plunging model cannot resolve this debate, and yet it suggests that US planners might have considered more closely the option of withholding or strategically parsing out the technology in these new aircraft, based on consideration of the parameters laid out in the model. Future case-research could systematically apply the model to similar decisions regarding weapon systems within the context of specific foreign competitors, such as a rising China.
The refined plunging model explores the most basic strategic interactions in this context, but can fruitfully be expanded. One extension for future research would be to relax the unitary rational actor assumption and introduce defense industries/firms as strategic agents. Also, war occurrence, which is treated as exogenous to force structure planning decisions in the current model could be endogenized in a number of interesting ways. Finally, the distinction between weapons developed for deterrence purposes versus weapons developed for defense purposes may enter planners' calculations according to a different logic, thereby altering the results. These extensions could generate many additional insights, thereby furthering our understanding of military technology, diffusion, and strategic choice.
APPENDIX: PROOFS Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of the theorem is done in two parts. We initiate the analysis by assuming ( †) and construct the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the levels game (Part 1). Then, regardless of the play in the levels game, we show that all Sequential Markov Perfect existence and uniqueness of the Sequential Markov Perfect Equilibrium.
Part 1:
The proof of existence and uniqueness of Markov Perfect Equilibrium in levels is constructive. We show that, given ( †), the strategy profile outline based on policy function ) ( x s in the statement of Theorem 1 composes the unique Markov Perfect
Equilibrium of the levels game. First we establish that if
is an optimal choice for state x regardless the other agents action. 
Lemma 1 Given ( †), for all
} 2 , 1 { ∈ i and i j \ } 2 , 1 { ∈ such that j i x x α ≤ , in
Lemma 2 For all for all
, given ( †) and
, there exists discount factors This implies the maximum is the unique solution to the following conditions: In this part of the proof, we establish that all Sequential Markov Perfect Equilibria must include capacity play that follows ( †). x optimal. The result is a path with identical play for agent j, identical levels for agent i and greater capacities in each period. Based on Assumption 2, the payoff of agent i is greater in each period with the maximal capacity strategy than without. Since the total payoff is a weighted sum of these per-period payoffs, the total payoff must also be greater. ■
For all
)) ( ), ( ( x x δ δ δ ∈ 0 ) , ( ) , ,( > ∂
Lemma 3 All Sequential Markov Perfect Equilibria involve maximum capacity ( †).

Proof of Lemma
Comparative Statics
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose to the contrary that game is essentially a prisoner's dilemma and not investing is a strictly dominated strategy.
This assumption adds considerable parsimony to the analysis without impacting the result.
9. The assumption of binary extreme states: war and peace, is clearly a gross oversimplification of the conflict scenarios a country can face. The specific binary assumption is not important for the plunging result; we could instead assume a whole continuum of states between war and peace, but notation and formalization of the model would become rather cumbersome. The key feature that drives our results is that in some states of nature capacity is important while in others it is not. 10. Assumption 3 is only used to guarantee global uniqueness of the SMPE. Under only Assumptions 1 and 2, the characterization of the equilibrium is unaffected, but we can only establish that the play described by the theorem is the unique SMPE such that capacities follow ( †).
